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Introduction
A financial audit is characterized by a relatively structured process in which a company hires
an independent public accounting firm to express an opinion on its financial statements. Typically
an audit is completed each year, and consists of an in-depth examination into a company, involving
a great deal of planning and organization by the auditing firm. Before the audit begins, an audit
program is designed, which identifies what specific steps must be taken to assure the client's
financial situation is adequately investigated. An audit senior, typically an auditor with three to five
years of auditing experience, supervises and evaluates several audit staff members as they work to
complete the steps in the audit program.
In the process of completing an audit several behavioral issues can arise. One in particular,
known as premature sign-off, occurs when a staff auditor reports that he or she completed a
specified audit step without actually performing the required work. As one might guess, premature
sign-off is strictly prohibited by auditing firms since its occurrence is potentially harmful both to the
client and auditing firm. The client is paying for a high quality audit, and has a lot at stake if the
auditor does not detect a problem in its financial information. The auditing firm could potentially
face liability for giving an audit opinion that was not merited if the step that was prematurely signed
off would have revealed information that would have changed the auditor' s opinion. Aside from the
harm premature sign-off can cause either party, it clearly strays from the professional standards that
auditors are held closely to and directly reduces the quality of an audit (Kelley and Margheim 1990)
and therefore demands concern.
Negative as it is, research shows that premature sign-off has been occurring for over twenty
years. Many studies have examined auditors' tendencies to prematurely sign off (Alderman and

Deitrick 1982; Buchman and Tracy 1982; Kelly and Margheim 1987, 1990; Margheim and Pany
1986; McNair 1991 ; Rhode 1978). All of these studies have provided valuable insight into factors
that contribute to premature sign-off, such as time budget pressure and level of experience of the
staff auditor. Limited studies, however, have examined the organizational response to the discovery
of premature sign-off.
The research presented in this paper is an extension ofresearch completed by Kaplan (1995),
who examined senior auditors' reporting intentions upon discovery of premature sign-off of an audit
step by a staff member. His research found that audit seniors do not always formally report the
discovery of premature sign-off, even though firms have formal policies requiring such reporting
(McNair 1991). In Kaplan' s (1995) research, an experiment was conducted in which subjects were
asked to respond to a hypothetical scenario in which an audit staff member prematurely signed off
on a required audit step. His study manipulated two situational variables: the necessity of the audit
step skipped and the work history of the staff auditor. He found both variables had an effect on the
senior auditors' reporting intentions upon their discovery of a staff member' s premature sign-off.
Kaplan' s (1995) study also examined the effects of the audit seniors ' gender and audit staff
evaluation experience on reporting intentions. He found the audit seniors' gender did not affect
their reporting intentions; however, their level of audit staff evaluation experience did affect their
reporting intentions. Specifically, audit seniors who had performed more staff evaluations were
more likely to report the premature sign-off behavior.
In addition to reporting intentions, two additional dependent variables were investigated by
Kaplan ( 1995): the participating audit seniors' overall performance rating of the staff auditor and
their willingness to work with the staff auditor on a future engagement. Kaplan' s ( 1995) research
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found similar results for the overall performance rating measure as he did for the reporting
intentions measure. However, the only variable found to affect the audit seniors' willingness to
work with the staff auditor in the future was the staff auditor' s work history.
The current paper, as an extension of Kaplan's (1995) research, examined the occurrence of
premature sign-off and how audit seniors react to the discovery of premature sign-off by a staff
auditor. Two variables were manipulated: time budget pressure and whether the audit step was
prematurely signed off intentionally or unintentionally. The current study also examined the effect
of the audit.seniors' staff evaluation experience, as did Kaplan (1995). In addition, research
subjects were asked to complete a personality test to determine if they have Type A or Type B
personality traits so that the effect of this variable could be investigated. The same three dependent
variables examined by Kaplan (1995) were also examined here: reporting intentions, overall
performance rating of the staff auditor, and willingness to work with the staff auditor on a future
engagement.

The Auditing Environment
Auditors are driven toward producing a quality audit by several factors, including
professional standards and liability exposure. The first standard of field work as established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) requires the proper supervision of
assistants (AI CPA 1993 AU Sect. 310.01 ). The AI CPA has also determined "the work of each
assistant should be reviewed to determine whether it was adequately performed" (AICP A 1993 AU
Sect. 311 .13). These standards are set to ensure audits maintain high quality standards. In addition
to authoritative standards, the public influences auditors to sustain high quality standards through
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their demands. Without confidence a quality audit has been performed, an audit has little value to
its end users.
While there are many factors that encourage the maintenance of high audit quality, auditors
are facing more and more issues that may lower audit quality. Audit consumers are increasingly
concerned with reducing the costs of audit services, which could lead auditors to rush audit
procedures and thereby decrease audit quality. In their survey research, Margheim and Kelley
(1992) found the most common audit billing arrangement currently used is a fixed-fee contract.
This method contrasts sharply with the hourly billing procedure that historically was the most
common billing arrangement. A fixed-fee contract encourages auditors to complete the audit in the
most efficient manner, and thereby may lead to decreased audit quality.
To counteract pressures to decrease audit quality, most firms have established formal
policies which state severe consequences for certain audit quality reduction acts, or behaviors that
are considered to directly reduce audit quality. Audit quality reduction acts include a wide range of
prohibited behaviors, including premature sign-off on an audit procedure, reducing the amount of
work performed on an audit step below what is considered reasonable, failing to research an
accounting principle, making superficial reviews of client documents, and accepting weak client
explanations (Kelley and Margheim 1990). While the standard punishments for these behaviors
vary, McN air ( 1991) found the formal punishment for premature sign-off is generally dismissal.
This harsh formal punishment is intended to deter auditors from participating in such severe audit
quality reduction acts.
Ultimately, auditors must work in a "zone of compromise" (McNair 1991 ), to balance the
cost versus quality dilemma they face on a regular basis. Informal networks within auditing firms
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are used to help maintain a balance between cost and quality (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985).
Informal networks are used by partners and managers of firms to communicate information in a
more personal manner as opposed to more formal means. This information ultimately trickles down
to senior and staff auditors and is typically accessed within the first two years of an auditor's
employment (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985). Dirsmith and Covaleski (1985) found that auditors
prefer to receive information via informal means rather than through more bureaucratic methods
because it is easier to obtain and is available earlier in their careers. Informal networks can be used
to communicate information that strays from documented firm policies. These ideas, or
countemorms, are used to bypass the stated norms. McNair (1991) asserts these countemorms arise
from the cost versus quality dilemma. In this way firms can continue to maintain strict formal
policies, and can communicate different standards through informal networks to guide behavior.
As mentioned above, dismissal generally represents the formal punishment for premature
sign-off and other audit quality reduction acts (McNair 1991 ). However, McNair (1991) found
selective enforcement of these policies in many instances, based on a case by case evaluation.
Selective enforcement of firm policies may stem from the informal networks that exist within
auditing firms which McN air ( 1991) states are used to balance the cost versus quality dilemma.
Such organizational culture may suggest compliance with formal firm policies is discretionary.
Audit quality reduction acts have been occurring for many years. Research attests that
premature sign-off behavior, in particular, has been occurring with some consistency for at least
twenty years. Rhode' s ( 1978) survey research found that 60 percent of auditors admitted to having
prematurely signed off on a required audit procedure. In a similar endeavor, Alderman and Deitrick
(1982) found 31 percent of their respondents indicated they believed that auditors have prematurely
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signed-off on required audit steps. Another research study by McNair ( 1991) found that 20 percent
of auditors surveyed admitted engaging in premature sign-off behavior.
Most of the research that has been conducted on premature sign-off has been from the
perspective of the auditors committing the premature sign off, in an attempt to understand what
motivates such behavior. Rhode (1978) found staff auditors and below are more likely than more
experienced auditors to engage in premature sign-off. Similarly, Alderman and Deitrick (1982)
found the auditors prematurely signing off required steps were most likely staff auditors or below
(39 percent) and least likely to be partners (11 percent). In addition to level of experience, the
necessity of the audit step contributes to premature sign-off behavior (Rhode 1978, Alderman and
Deitrick 1982). Even though audit programs are intended only to include necessary and important
audit procedures, occasionally, during the course of the audit, a step is deemed to be unnecessary
because other audit procedures sufficiently test the assertion.
Rhode (1978) found that the primary motivating factor for premature sign off is time budget
pressure. Time budget pressure is defined as pressure to complete the audit within certain time
constraints. (These time constraints can vary widely from one audit to the next.) In addition, Kelly
and Margheim (1990) found a positive relationship between time budget pressure and audit quality
reduction acts, including premature sign-off, up to a budget that was "very tight, practically
unattainable."
While significant research has examined the motivation for auditors to prematurely sign-off,
little has been done to explore the managerial response to the discovery of premature sign-off.
Kaplan (1995) began a new stream ofresearch by looking at factors that influence a firm ' s response
to premature sign-off by audit staff. Specifically, he examined the reporting intentions of audit
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seniors upon learning an audit staff member under their supervision had prematurely signed off on a
required audit step. The motivation for this new research direction was to examine whether senior
auditors will always comply with organizational policy and report such incidents, or if the audit
senior would react in a different way under certain conditions. Knowing that particular factors can
lead a staff auditor to prematurely sign-off, Kaplan (1995) sought to determine if some of the same
factors would affect an audit senior's reaction to the discovery of premature sign-off.
Regardless of the staff member's motivation, the audit senior is responsible for formally
reporting all discovered occurrences of audit quality reduction acts, such as premature sign-off, in a
staff member's evaluation at the end of an audit. A partner in the firm would typically follow up on
the evaluation by carrying out a disciplinary action. Since the formal punishment for premature
sign-off is generally dismissal from the firm, an audit senior might be hesitant to report all instances
of premature sign-off that are discovered. Seniors may also be reluctant to always follow formal
firm policies because of the counternorms present within the firms (which, again, are due to the cost
versus quality dilemma they constantly face). Staff auditors may know about these counternorms
via their organization's informal networks, leading to behavior that may be contrary to formal firm
policy.
Kaplan (1995) found an audit senior will more likely formally report the findings of
premature sign-off under certain conditions. Kaplan (1995) performed an experiment in which audit
seniors read a hypothetical scenario describing their discovery of an audit staff member who
prematurely signed off a required audit step. The audit seniors were then asked to give their
response to this discovery. Kaplan' s (1995) experiment manipulated the necessity of the audit step
prematurely signed-off (necessary versus unnecessary) as well as the work history of the audit staff
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member (good versus poor). Kaplan' s (1995) results showed that audit seniors' reporting
intentions were much greater when the audit step was necessary or when the audit staff member had
a poor work history. Kaplan (1995) also found that audit seniors who have had more experience in
completing performance appraisals are more likely to report the incidence of premature sign-off.
The current research used essentially the same method and format as Kaplan (1995) to investigate
additional factors that may contribute to an audit senior' s response to premature sign-off.

Hypotheses
Prior research has shown that time budget pressure acts as the primary motivating factor for
a staff auditor' s premature sign-off (Rhode 1978). Kelly and Margheim (1990) also found there is a
positive relationship between time budget pressure and the likelihood of engaging in audit quality
reduction acts. The fact that a staff auditor has been under time budget pressure prior to prematurely
signing off an audit step may influence audit seniors' reporting decisions. Having previously
worked as an audit staff member, the senior may be able to relate to time budget pressures
experienced by staff members. Also, an audit senior is charged with supervising staff members and
making sure that the time budget is met on every audit. Therefore, his or her job performance is
threatened if a staff auditor goes over the time budget, and he or she may be more lenient toward a
staff member who prematurely signs off under pressure of a tight time budget in order to meet the
budget. On the other hand, if the staff member was not under significant time budget pressure, a
senior may have less sympathy for the staff member who prematurely signed-off on an audit step.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested.
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Hypothesis 1. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will

be greater when the staff member 's premature sign-off behavior occurs under conditions of an
easy time budget.
No research has been done on intentional versus unintentional premature sign-off of an audit
step. For the purpose of this research, unintentional premature sign-off was defined as premature
sign-off on an audit procedure as a result of confusion concerning what needed to be done. An audit
senior may feel this kind of situation should not be formally reported due to the staff member' s
intentions. The senior may also blame him or herself for inadequately supervising the individual,
and therefore may be resistant to formally reporting the incident. Intentional premature sign-off, on
the other hand, implies the staff member did not perform the step even though he or she knew it was
required. This situation should result in less sympathy by the audit senior, and may lead him or her
to formally report the occurrence. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested.
Hypothesis 2. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will

be greater when the staff member who engages in the premature sign-off behavior did so
intentionally.
No research has been conducted on the behavior of audit seniors with Type A or Type B
personalities regarding the discovery of premature sign-off by an audit staff member. Type A
behavior is characterized primarily by the "combination of highly competitive achievement
orientation, a sense of time urgency, and excessive hostility in response to frustration." In contrast,
Type B behavior is more emotional and possesses fewer Type A traits (Sanders and Malkis 1982).
Kelley and Margheim (1990) found audit staff members are more concerned about time budgets and
are more likely to underreport their time under the supervision of a senior with a Type A
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personality. While this research did not examine the occurrence of premature sign-off in relation to
a senior's Type A personality, it seems reasonable that a concern about time budgets may also
correspond to a higher instance of premature sign-off under tight time budget pressure and the
supervision by a senior with Type A personality traits. No research has examined whether Type A
seniors react differently to the occurrence of premature sign-off, and the current hypothesis suggests
that perhaps seniors with Type A personalities will react differently to the discovery of premature
sign-off. Type A personality characteristics may lead a senior to be worried about getting the audit
done within the time budget over and above other audit concerns due to the Type A emphasis on
time urgency. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested.
Hypothesis 3. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will
be greater for audit seniors who do not display Type A personality traits.
Kaplan (1995) found the propensity to formally report an incidence of premature sign-off
was greater when the senior had more staff appraisal experience. Research completed prior to
Kaplan's (1995) indicated an auditor's work experience may have a strong influence onjudgment.
Experience in completing performance evaluations may cultivate a high regard for auditor equality,
and thereby increase reporting tendencies. Not disciplining a staff member for premature sign-off
behavior would be considered unfair to other staff members who encountered time budget pressures
without turning to audit quality reduction acts. The current research will examine the hypothesis
again to determine the generalizability of Kaplan's (1995) findings.
Hypothesis 4. Senior auditors' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will
be greater for auditors with more staff appraisal experience.
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Method
Task
Audit seniors and managers, who all work for the same firm, were given case materials
describing a hypothetical audit client, A-1 Appliances. Each of the individuals worked
independently in completing the case. Materials were adapted from a case by Kaplan (1995) and
included information that remained constant across all cases, including an overview of the company
and its production cycle and financial statements for the current and prior year. This information
was included in case materials primarily to provide context for the research subjects. Also included
in the case was information about Laura Smith, an audit staff member under the supervision of the
participating auditor. In all cases, Laura, having a good reputation in the office for being competent
and hard working, prematurely signed-off on an audit step that was subsequently determined by the
audit senior to be unnecessary. An unnecessary audit step and good work history of the staff
member displayed greater variations in responses in Kaplan's (1995) research and, therefore, would
be less likely to influence the responses ofresearch subjects in the current study.
Participants were asked first to read the information about A-1 Appliances and Laura's work
on the audit, and then to provide several appraisal judgments. The research subjects also answered
background questions and questions to determine their personality type. A sample of the case
materials is included in Appendix A. The sample case provided is the version with intentional
premature sign off by the staff auditor under a tight time budget (see below for further discussion of
the four versions of the case).
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Independent Variables

Four versions of the case were prepared based upon the levels of two independent variables
(time budget pressure and intent). Time budget pressure and intent were manipulated between
subjects. Thus, each participating auditor was asked to reply to one scenario describing premature
sign-off behavior. Two other pieces of data (personality type and experience level) were obtained
from the participating auditors as well.

Time Budget Pressure
Two levels oftime budget pressure were constructed. Under the tight time budget pressure
scenario, the case read, in part, " ... you believed that it would be VERY DIFFICULT (in fact, nearly
impossible) to meet the inventory budget." Alternatively, under the easy time budget scenario, the
case read, in part, " ...you believed that it would be FAIRLY EASY to meet [the inventory budget] ."
In all versions of the case, Laura completed the audit work in the budgeted amount of time, but
would have gone over budget if she had not prematurely signed off.

Intentional versus Unintentional Premature Sign-Off
Two scenarios for intent were constructed. Under the intentional premature sign-off
scenario, the case read, in part, "When you discussed the matter with Laura, she said she
INTENTIONALLY SKIPPED the step because she felt it was important to not go over budget and
she thought the step was unnecessary." Alternatively, for the unintentional premature sign-off
scenario, the case read, in part, "When you discussed the matter with Laura, she indicated that she
found the audit step requirements unclear and that she was uncertain how much work needed to be
done .. . You conclude that Laura' s premature sign-off of the audit step was probably an
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UNINTENTIONAL MISTAKE. However, you also believe there should have been enough doubt in
Laura's mind about the proper interpretation of the audit step that she should have asked you about
it up front."

Personality Type

Participating auditors were asked to complete a nine question self-evaluation to determine
their personality type (Type A or Type B). The questions were taken from the Sales Type A
personality scale (Sales 1969) as refined by Caplan (1972) and Jolly (1979). All subjects were given
the same questions, which were included as part of the biographical data each auditor completed.

Evaluation Experience ofSenior

Participating auditors were asked the question, "How many times have you evaluated the
performance of a staff auditor?" Responses from this question were used in data analysis. This
question was included as a part of the biographical data each auditor completed.

Dependent Variables

The participating auditors were asked to read the case scenario and then complete several
questions regarding their performance evaluation of Laura, the staff auditor who prematurely signed
off the audit step. Following each audit engagement, the senior in-charge auditor completes a
performance evaluation on each staff member who was a part of the audit team. The questions in
this case revolved around this end-of-audit evaluation. These evaluations are used by the firm to
make decisions regarding salaries, promotions, and future work assignments (Harrell and Wright
1990), and are therefore of ultimate importance to the firm. By having each research subject answer
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questions about his or her evaluation of Laura, the current research was able to assess the auditors'
reporting tendencies, their overall performance rating for Laura, and the likelihood the participating
auditor would support working with Laura on future engagements.

Reporting Intentions

To measure the senior auditors' reporting intentions, participating auditors responded to the
question, "Given Laura's performance as described in this case, how likely is it that your written
evaluation of Laura would include the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed
off?" The response scale ranged from "1," which was labeled "Extremely UNLIKELY to include in
written evaluation" to "7," which was labeled "Extremely UK.ELY to include in written
evaluation." Although in actual encounters with premature sign-off auditors must choose either to
report or not to report, the seven point scale has certain advantages. Participating auditors may be
unwilling to reveal their actual intentions with a dichotomous variable. Further, participating
auditors may not feel that they had been given enough information in the case to make a definite
decision. Kaplan ( 1995) used a similar question and scale in his research.

Overall Performance Rating

When an audit senior completes a performance evaluation, he or she generally has to give
each staff member an overall performance rating. This rating could be adversely affected by the
discovery of premature sign-off as reflected in the rating of "Unacceptable." To evaluate this
possibility, participating auditors were asked the question, "In your written evaluation of Laura' s
performance, how likely is it that you would evaluate her overall performance as "Unacceptable"
because of the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed off?"

14

The response scale

ranged from " 1," which was labeled "Extremely UNLIKELY to evaluate as ' Unacceptable" ' to "7,"
which was labeled "Extremely LIKELY to evaluate as ' Unacceptable."' Kaplan (1995) asked a
similar question in his research.

Audit Team Support

To measure the audit team support, the participating auditors were asked the question, "To
what extent would you support Laura' s request to be assigned to you on another engagement?" The
response scale range from " 1," which was labeled "Would NOT SUPPORT Laura' s request" to "7,"
which was labeled "Would strongly SUPPORT Laura' s request." This question was also used by
Kaplan (1995) in his research. Note that this scale differs slightly from the response scales in the
other two dependent measures. For this measure, a smaller rating is indicative of a more negative
response to Laura' s premature sign-off behavior. In the reporting intentions and performance rating
measures a higher rating corresponds to a more harsh reaction to the premature sign-off.

Participating Auditors

Participating auditors were "in charge" auditors and audit managers who supervise audit
engagements on a day-to-day basis and perform evaluations of staff members at the end of audit
engagements. All auditors worked for the same firm . Ninety-one cases were distributed, and 58
cases were returned. Three auditors failed one of two manipulation checks. One manipulation
check was included for each independent variable that was manipulated--time budget pressure and
intent. Therefore, the results reported here are based on the 55 cases that were completed correctly.
As shown in Table 1, the mean level of experience and number of staff auditors evaluated by the
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participating auditors was 58 months and 40 appraisals, respectively. Thirty-eight percent of the
participating auditors were female and 62% were male.
Table 1 also presents information about the participants' personal experience with premature
sign-off. Twenty percent of auditors surveyed stated they had encountered intentional premature
sign-off by an audit staff member under their supervision. Over 90% responded that they had
experience with unintentional premature sign-off by audit staff members. These figures suggest that
unintentional premature sign-off is quite commonplace, and is dealt with often in public accounting
firms. Kaplan ( 1995) found that one-third of participants in his study had encountered premature
sign-off of an audit staff member. However, his questionnaire did not delineate between intentional
and unintentional premature sign-off, a fact noted by Kaplan (1995) (his intent was to learn about
his participating auditors' experience with intentional premature sign-off). Kaplan's (1995) figure
is 50% higher than the current finding of a 20% rate of intentional premature sign-off, which may
indicate that some of Kaplan's (1995) respondents were including unintentional premature sign-off
as a qualifying experience with premature sign-off.
Also presented in Table 1 are the results of the personality test which was completed by each
participating auditor. Lower scores indicate a higher presence of Type A personality traits, while
higher scores indicate an individual is more likely to be classified as Type B. Given that the
possible range of scores was 9 through 63, the mean score of 24.54 indicates that the participating
auditors as a whole tend to be more Type A individuals than Type B.

16

Results
Analysis-of-covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine the statistical association
between the independent variables and each of the three dependent measures. The covariates in the
model were the audit seniors' gender, personality type, and evaluation experience. The model also
included two manipulated variables, time budget pressure and intent. ANCOVA results are
presented in Table 2, and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Table 3 includes the mean,
standard deviation, minimum score, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum score.
Panel A in each table presents the results for the reporting intentions dependent measure, which
found the likelihood of the senior auditor reporting the premature sign-off behavior in a written
evaluation of the staff member. Panel Bin each table displays results for the performance appraisal
dependent measure, the variable that asked senior auditors to determine how likely it is they would
classify the staff member' s overall performance as "Unacceptable." The audit team support
dependent measure is included in Panel C of each table to present findings on the audit seniors'
willingness to work with the staff member on future engagements.
Reporting Intentions
The dependent measure of greatest interest in this study is the reporting intentions measure,
since auditing firms have strict rules requiring audit seniors to report the incidences of premature
sign-off that they discover. Results which can demonstrate that audit seniors' compliance with this
rule are influenced by certain variables are clearly of interest. The other two dependent variables
(the performance appraisal measure and the audit team support measure) are exploratory in nature,
and were included to provide additional insight into an audit senior' s reaction to premature sign-off
by a staff member. They also allow for a comparison with Kaplan' s (1995) results.
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In accordance with the first hypothesis, this study's results suggest that a senior auditor's
propensity to formally report will be greater when the staff member's premature sign-off occurs
under conditions of an easy time budget. As shown in Table 2 Panel A, budget pressure is
significant (p=.01). The mean values reported in Table 3 Panel A show that participants were more
likely to report the occurrence of premature sign-off under an easy time budget (4.5 for tight budget
pressure versus 5.8 for easy budget pressure). In addition, median scores indicate a difference in the
auditors' reporting intentions under a tight time budget and an easy time budget. The median score
of 7 in the instance of an easy time budget indicates that at least 50% of respondents would
definitely report the occurrence under such conditions. On the other hand, under a tight time budget
the median score is 4.5, indicating only a slight inclination to formally report the discovery of
premature sign-off under a tight time budget by at least 50% of respondents.
The second hypothesis stated that senior auditors' propensity to formally report would be
greater if the premature sign-off behavior was intentional. Table 2 Panel A shows that intent is
significant (p=.01), and the mean scores displayed in Table 3 Panel A show that audit seniors were
more likely to report if the premature sign-off was intentional (5.7 for intentional sign-off versus 4.5
for unintentional sign-off).
The third hypothesis considered whether a respondent's personality type would affect his or
her response to premature sign-off. The results presented in Table 2 Panel A indicate that
personality type is not a significant factor (p=.12). It appears that the personality type of the
participating auditors did not have a significant effect on their reporting intentions.
The fourth research hypothesis was intended to test the generalizability of Kaplan' s ( 1995)
findings when he tested the same hypothesis and found that auditors with more staff appraisal
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experience were more likely to formally report the occurrence of premature sign-off. Table 2 Panel
A indicates that staff appraisal experience is, in fact, marginally significant (p=.09), and the
covariate coefficient for evaluation experience is positive. This result re-affirms Kaplan' s (1995)
findings that more experienced auditors are more likely to report the discovery of premature signoff
Performance Appraisal

This analysis examined the association between the independent variables and the overall
performance rating. The dependent measure was the likelihood of evaluating the performance of the
staff member as "Unacceptable" because she did not perform an audit step that she signed off.
ANCOV A was used to test for associations with the dependent measure. Table 2 Panel B gives
statistical results of this analysis, and Table 3 Panel B displays descriptive statistics for this
measure. Of the two manipulated variables, only intent was determined to be significant (p<.01), as
shown in Table 2 Panel B. Means displayed in Table 3 Panel B give evidence that participating
auditors were more likely to classify the staff auditor's overall performance as "Unacceptable" when
the behavior was intentional (3.4 for intentional sign-off versus 1.8 for unintentional sign-off). A
maximum score of 4 was given for the performance appraisal measure for unintentional premature
sign-off, indicating that all respondents were only marginally willing to assess the staff auditor' s
overall performance as "Unacceptable" under this condition. In contrast, the maximum score under
intentional premature sign-off was 7, or "extremely likely to evaluate as ' Unacceptable."'
Also significant under the performance appraisal measure was senior auditors' evaluation
experience (p=.06), as shown in Table 2 Panel B. (As with the analysis in Panel A, the covariate
coefficient for evaluation experience is positive.) This finding provides evidence that seniors who
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have completed more staff evaluations are more likely to classify the behavior of an auditor who
prematurely signs off a required step as "Unacceptable."
Audit Team Support
The audit team support dependent measure examined the likelihood that, given the audit
staff member' s behavior, the senior would support working with the staff member in the future.
ANCOV A analysis identified the association between the independent variables and audit team
support. Table 2 Panel C and Table 3 Panel C give the statistical results and descriptive statistics of
this analysis, respectively. Consistent with the reporting intentions measure, the only significant
manipulated variable was intent (p=.04). Table 3 Panel C displays the mean scores for both
intentional and unintentional premature sign-off, and indicates that respondents were more likely to
support working with a staff member who unintentionally signed off prematurely (mean= 5.3) than
a staff member who did so intentionally (mean= 4.5). No other variable acheived statistical
significance.

Discussion and Conclusion
Studies indicate that premature sign-off has been occurring with some regularity for many
years. This behavior is considered a severe audit quality reduction act, and has the potential to
significantly harm an auditing firm. An auditor may issue an opinion on the fairness of a set of
financial statements based on evidence that does not exist because a vital step was prematurely
signed off. This may lead to negative financial aspects of a company being overlooked and not
taken into account when the opinion is made. When creditors or potential stockholders are relying
on these financial statements, they could be led to believe that a company is in a good financial
position when it may actually have some significant problems. Premature sign-off potentially has a
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snowball effect--at the time of the premature sign-off it may seem insignificant and minor, yet the
repercussions may be very damaging.
The issue at hand, then, involves the motivation for premature sign-off. What causes it to
continue to occur, despite its potentially harmful effects? Prior studies hwe indicated that
organizational culture may not always conform with formal firm policy, leading certain behaviors to
occur even though formal firm policy restricts the behavior (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985; McNair
1991 ). This may be the reason that premature sign-off continues to occur, despite the fact that firm
policies typically strictly forbid the behavior.
The purpose of this study was to examine whether audit seniors always comply with the
reporting requirements of their firm in conjunction with the discovery of premature sign-off.
Kaplan (1995) found that necessity of the audit step and staff member work history may affect a
senior auditor's propensity to formally report the discovery of premature sign-off. A review of the
relevant literature suggested that other factors may also affect the likelihood of a discovered instance
of premature sign-off being reported. The current work extends Kaplan's (1995) study by testing
three other variables' influence on the reporting intentions of the senior auditor. These variables
consisted of time budget pressure, intent of the staff member in committing the premature sign-off,
and the personality type of the senior auditor.
Results of this study indicate that under conditions of intentional premature sign-off by a
staff member, a senior auditor is 1) more likely to formally report the incident, 2) more likely to
classify the overall performance of the staff auditor as "Unacceptable," and 3) less likely to support
working with the staff member in the future. As expected, results showed that intentional premature
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sign-off is viewed more negatively by senior auditors than unintentional premature sign-off (i.e.,
premature sign-off due to confusion over the requirements of the audit step).
This study also indicated premature sign-off is more likely to be included in the formal
written evaluation of a staff auditor if it occurred under an easy time budget. (The easy time budget
scenario indicated that the staff auditor should have had adequate time to complete all requirements
and was under no time urgency to finish the necessary tasks in the audit step.) This result was also
expected since prior research has shown that time budget pressure is the primary motivating factor
for premature sign-off (Rhode 1978). When there is extensive time budget pressure, it is placed
both upon the staff member and the audit senior, so it is reasonable to hypothesize that the presence
oftime budget pressure may influence a senior's reporting tendencies. The findings reported above
support the notion that all premature sign-off behavior is not treated equally, as firm policies would
require. Instead, this study's results support prior studies which found that formal firm rules may be
subject to interpretation.
These conclusions are supported by Table 4, which reports the means of the participating
auditors' responses to the manipulated variables. Results are presented for each dependent measure.
Panel A presents data for the reporting intentions measure, which is the dependent measure of
primary interest. As shown in the table, comparison of these means shows that intentional
premature sign-off that occurred under an easy time budget was the most likely scenario to be
formally reported by the audit senior (with a mean of 6.24). In contrast, a situation of premature
sign-off under a tight time budget that was unintentional was seen in a more favorable light by
participating audit seniors (with a mean of 3.92).
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Table 4 displays similar results for the other dependent measures in Panel B and Panel C, the
performance appraisal measure and the audit team support measure, respectively. Intentional
premature sign-off under an easy time budget reports the highest mean for the performance appraisal
measure in Panel B (3.71). Similar to the findings for the reporting intentions measure, this leads to
the conclusion that senior auditors are more likely to classify the overall performance of a staff
auditor who commits intentional premature sign-off which occurs under little or no time budget
pressure as "Unacceptable." Panel C also supports the notion that senior auditors are more critical
of a staff auditor who prematurely signs off intentionally under an easy time budget. This is
evidenced by a mean of 4.41 in the corresponding cell in Table 4, which is the smallest mean of the
four possible scenarios. (Remember that for Panel C, the audit team support measure, a smaller
mean represents less audit team support.)
The current study also confirmed Kaplan's (1995) research which found that reporting
tendencies were stronger among participants with more evaluation experience. This suggests that as
an auditor gains more experience evaluating staff members, the less tolerant he or she is of
premature sign-off. As Kaplan (1995) concluded, this may result from the auditor becoming more
concerned with staff auditor equality as he or she gains more evaluation experience.
This research supports prior studies on premature sign-off in finding that premature sign-off
occurs and that it is not always reprimanded. Beyond prior research, however, this study provides
additional insight into why premature sign-off continues to occur. Until premature sign-off is
viewed as strictly prohibited under all circumstances and staff auditors understand that all
discovered instances will be reported, it will continue to occur and potentially degrade audit quality.
If senior auditors take the results of this study and alter their behavior when evaluating a staff
auditor who prematurely signs off, perhaps the perception that premature sign-off rules are
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selectively enforced will change. Ultimately, a change in perceptions of staff auditors could lead to
higher quality audits in the future.
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TABLE 1
PROFILE OF PARTICIPATING AUDITORS (N=55)
PANEL A: CONTINUOUS MEASURES

Mean
(Standard Deviation)
Months of Audit Experience

57.86
(28.40)

Number of Staff Auditors Evaluated

39.98
(41.71)

Personality Type (A/B)
(Range= 9 - 63)

24.54
(7.03)

PANEL B: DICHOTOMOUS MEASURES

Number of
Responses
Gender: Male
Female

Mean

21

62%
38%

Personal determination of intentional premature
sign-off behavior by audit staff member

11

20%

Personal determination of unintentional premature
sign-off behavior by audit staff member

50

91%

34
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TABLE2
ANALYSIS OF CO-VARIANCE RESULTS

PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE

Source
Gender
Evaluation Experience
Personality
Budget Pressure
Intent
Budget Pressure x Intent

F-Value
2.22
3.00
2.57
6.64
4.76
0.00

Probability
0.14
0.09
0.12
0.01
0.03
1.00

PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE

Source
Gender
Evaluation Experience
Personality
Budget Pressure
Intent
Budget Pressure x Intent

F-Value
2.23
3.70
0.12
0.01
15.90
0.46

Probability
0.14
0.06
0.73
0.91
0.00
0.50

PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE

Source
Gender
Evaluation Experience
Personality
Budget Pressure
Intent
Budget Pressure x Intent
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F-Value
0.00
1.29
0.05
0.00
4.31
0.00

Probability
0.96
0.26
0.83
0.97
0.04
0.96

TABLE3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES
PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE

Experimental
Treatment
Tight Budget Pressure
Easy Budget Pressure
Intentional
Unintentional

Mean
4.5
5.8
5.7
4.5

Standard
Deviation
1.7
1.5
1.6
1.7

Minimum
Score
2
2
2
2

First
Quartile
3
5
5
3

Median
4.5
7
6
5

Third
Quartile
6
7
7
6

Maximum
Score
7
7
7
7

Median
2.5
2
3
2

Third
Quartile
4
3
5
2

Maximum
Score
5
7
7
4

Median
5
5
5
5.5

Third
Quartile
6
6
5
6

Maximum
Score
7
7
7
7

PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE

Experimental
Treatment
Tight Budget Pressure
Easy Budget Pressure
Intentional
Unintentional

Mean
2.6
2.8
3.4
1.8

Standard
Deviation
1.4
1.9
1.7
1.0

Minimum
Score
1
1
1
1

First
Quartile
1
1.5
2
1

PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE

Experimental
Treatment
Tight Budget Pressure
Easy Budget Pressure
Intentional
Unintentional

Mean
4.9
4.8
4.5
5.3

Standard
Deviation
1.3
1.8
1.8
1.0

Minimum
Score
2
1
1
3
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First
Quartile
4
4
3
5

TABLE4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY TREATMENT MEASURE
PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE

Intentional

Unintentional

Tight
Budget
Pressure

5.07
(1.77)

3.92
(1.56)

Easy
Budget
Pressure

6.24
(1.25)

5.17
(1.75)

PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE

Intentional

Unintentional

Tight
Budget
Pressure

3.07
(1.33)

2.08
(1.24)

Easy
Budget
Pressure

3.71
(1.99)

1.58
(0.52)

PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE

Intentional

Unintentional

Tight
Budget
Pressure

4.57
(1.34)

5.33
(0.99)

Easy
Budget
Pressure

4.41
(2.06)

5.33
(1.07)
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Appendix A

A-1 Appliances Audit Case
Assume that you are the auditor in charge of the audit of A-1 Appliances, a publicly held company which
manufactures a complete line of commercial and residential water heaters. The firm is one of many
companies in the water heater industry and is of medium size in relation to its competitors.
A-1 has been in operation for over 30 years. Your firm has conducted the audit for the past four years
during which a good working relationship with A-1 has been established . A-1 has a May 31 year end.
John Green, who has been with the firm three years, is the CEO of A-1 Appliances. He has considerable
experience in the industry and is known in the community as an individual with high integrity.
Management places a strong emphasis on setting and achieving financial targets. As such, bonuses are
given to key management employees who meet their targets. Adequate operating budgets exist for the
internal audit department and the accounting department; both are made up of professionals with
adequate qualifications.
In terms of economic performance, A-1 has had an average annual growth rate in sales of about six
percent over the past decade ( 1987-1996). Bond covenants are not in threat of violation.
Relevant summarized financial information for the current and prior year are presented below and on the
next page.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
A-1 Appliances Mfg. Co., Inc.
Income Statement
For the years ending 5/31/96 & 5/31/95
Unaudited
(in $000s)
12.2.Q

Sales
Cost of Sales
Gross Profit
Other Expenses
Income Before Taxes
Income Taxes
Net Income
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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Audited
(in $000s)

1225.

$91,425
42,882

$87,320
39,194

48,543
41,931

48,126
42,006

6,612

6,120

--1222

-1...9%

A-1 Appliances Mfg. Co., Inc.
Balance Sheet
As of 5/31 /96 & 5/31/95
Unaudited
(in $000s)

Audited
(in $000s)

~

122.5.

$ 798
6,855

$ 387
6,634

ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash and Securities
Accounts Receivable (Net)
Inventory
Raw Material
Work in Process
Finished Goods
Total
Prepaids
Total Current Assets
Fixed Assets (Net)

$6,030
2,317

$5 ,991
2,247
4,522

--1.200
13,247
244
$21 ,144
19,070

12,760
382
$20, 163
17,268

$40,214

$ 37,431

Current Liabilities
Long Term Debt:
Bonds Payable, 9%
(due 12/31/2008)
Deferred Taxes
Total Liabilities
Equity

$ 11 ,925

$11 ,255

8,380

8,408

2,190
22,495
17,719

2,320
21 ,983
15,448

Total Liabilities and Equity

$40,214

$ 37,431

Total Assets

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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Overview of Production Cycle
A-1 Appliances generally has a good reputation for manufacturing quality products. A-1 does all of the
metal work on their heaters, including the construction of the tanks from rolled steel. Valves and other
small parts, such as thermostats, are purchased from outside suppliers.
Products are manufactured in discrete batches for inventory as well as for special orders. A "normal" job
cost system is utilized, i.e., jobs are assigned actual direct materials and direct labor costs and overhead
based on a predetermined rate. Raw material and finished goods inventory valuation is determined by the
FIFO method.
Material is issued to production from the stores department only upon receipt of a properly authorized
pre-numbered materials requisition. One copy of the requisition is maintained by the stores department,
and another is sent to the inventory clerk for updating of the materials ledger cards and posting to the job
cost sheets.
Direct labor is assigned to jobs through the use of work tickets which are summarized weekly by job in a
labor cost distribution summary. This summary is used to update job cost sheets at the end of each week.
Manufacturing overhead is assigned to jobs using a plant-wide predetermined overhead rate which is
developed at the beginning of each year. Common administrative costs are allocated to production,
selling, and administrative functions through a step down procedure. Overhead is applied to jobs at the
end of each week in conjunction with the direct labor update routine. Overhead is applied on the basis of
direct labor dollars.
A-1 employs a perpetual inventory system for all classes of inventory. A complete physical inventory is
taken at year end. Additionally, periodic check counts are performed on an interim basis. In prior years
the year end count had been well organized and executed, requiring about three days to complete.

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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Information Regarding Staff Member Performance
Your assistant for this audit, Laura Smith, has fourteen months of audit experience. Although Laura has
had prior manufacturing audit experience, she was new to the A-1 Appliances audit this year. Since
starting with the firm Laura has performed well on other audit engagements, and she has a good
reputation in the office for being competent and hard working.
Imagine that you are reviewing Laura's work in the inventory area. In the past, other staff have not had
much trouble meeting the inventory budget. However, this year, due to increasing fee pressures, THE
BUDGET WAS SET CONSIDERABLY TIGHTER than in previous years. Consequently, you believed
that it would be VERY DIFFICULT (in fact, nearly impossible) to meet the inventory budget. As a
result, you were surprised when Laura completed the work within the budgeted amount of time and
appeared to do a good job.
During your review of the substantive tests conducted by Laura, however, you determine that she did not
complete an audit step that she signed off. You are sure that Laura would have gone over budget if she
had followed the intended audit program and conducted the specified procedures. Although you didn ' t
realize it when you prepared the audit program, in considering this matter you reassess the importance of
this audit step. You conclude that the audit step is unnecessary, because several other procedures in the
program adequately test the area.
When you discussed the matter with Laura, she said she INTENTIONALLY SKIPPED the step because
she felt it was important to not go over budget and she thought the step was unnecessary. She believes
that being able to perform within budget is rewarded by the firm. Thus, even though she knew she was
prematurely signing off an audit step, she thought it was more important to finish within budget. Laura
stated that she did not previously discuss the matter because she was unsure whether you, the in-charge
auditor, would agree to the omission of the step.

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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The following questions refer to your analysis of the A-1 Appliances Case
1. How likely is it that you would require Laura to perform the audit step that she did not perform?
(Circle one number)

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
UNLIKELY
that I would

7
Extremely
LIKELY
that I would

2. Given Laura' s performance as described in this case, how likely is it that your written evaluation of
Laura would include the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed off?

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely UNLIKELY to
include in written
evaluation

Extremely
LIKELY to include
in written evaluation

3. In your written evaluation of Laura's performance, how likely is it that you would evaluate her overall
performance as "Unacceptable" because of the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed
off?

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
UNLIKELY to
evaluate as
"Unacceptable"

7
Extremely
LIKELY to
evaluate as
"Unacceptable"

4. To what extent would you support Laura' s request to be assigned to you on another engagement?
(That is, she initiates the request with scheduling.)

2

3

4

5

6

7

Would strongly
SUPPORT Laura' s
request

Would NOT
SUPPORT
Laura's request

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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5. How frequently do you believe that audit staff members sign off audit steps that have not been
performed?

3

2

4

5

6

7
Almost NEVER
OCCURS

Occurs on almost
EVERY audit
engagement

Case Scenario Information : Please respond to the following without looking back at the case
description .

1. The inventory time budget on the engagement this year was:

VERY DIFFICULT TO MEET

FAIRLY EASY TO MEET

2. Laura prematurely signed off on the audit procedure :

INTENTIONALLY

UNINTENTIONALLY

Discovery of Premature Sign Off: Please respond to the following based on your actual auditing
experience.

1. Have you ever determined that an audit staff member under your supervision INTENTIONALLY
signed off an audit step that was not performed (i.e., did not do an audit step even though he or she knew
it was required)?
YES

NO

If yes, how many times has this occurred?

- - - - times

2. Have you ever determined that an audit staff member under your supervision UNINTENTIONALLY
signed off an audit step that was not performed (i .e., as a result of confusion concerning what needed to
be done)?
NO

YES
If yes, how many times has this occurred?

- - - - times

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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Biographical Data

1. Approximately how many months have you been employed as an auditor in public accounting?

- - - - months
2. What percentage of your time has been spent on clients with inventory (whether manufacturing,
wholesale, or retail)?

---- %
3. How many times have you been involved in the audit of the inventory area beyond simply observing
the physical inventory (include separate years as separate times).

- - - - times
4. How would you assess your ability to evaluate the performance of a staff auditor?

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
LOW

7

Extremely
HIGH

5. How many times have you evaluated the performance of a staff auditor?
- - - - times

6. What is your gender?

MALE

FEMALE

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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The questions on this page are designed to show some aspects of your personality. The questions do not have any " right"
or "wrong" answers. They simply help to point out some characteristics of your personality. For each statement, select
one of the seven responses that describes the way you feel or~- Mark your choice by circling the appropriate response.
Use the following scale for all questions:

1
Very true
ofme

2

3

4
5
Neither very
true nor very
untrue of me

6

7
Not at all
true of me

1. I hate giving up before I'm absolutely sure that I' m beat.
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. Sometimes I feel that I shouldn ' t be working so hard, but something drives me on.
2

3

4

5

6

7

6

7

6

7

3. I thrive on challenging situations. The more challenges I have, the better.
2

3

4

5

4. In comparison to most people I know, I' m very involved in my work.
2

3

4

5

5. It seems as ifl need thirty hours a day to finish all the things I'm faced with .

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

7

6. In general, I approach my work more seriously than most people I know.

2

3

4

5

7. I guess there are some people who can be nonchalant about their work, but I'm not one of them.
2

3

4

5

6

7

8. My achievements are considered to be significantly higher than those of most people I know.
2

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

9. I am persistent and competitive in everything I do .

2

3

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
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